Abstracts

Despoina Alempaki (Warwick Buisiness School)
"Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence"
(based on joint work with Valeria Burdea and Daniel Read)
Abstract: In cases of conflict of interest, people can lie directly about payoff relevant private information, or they can evade the truth without lying directly. We analyse this situation theoretically and test the key predictions in an experimental sender-receiver setting. We find senders prefer to deceive through evasion rather than direct lying. This is because they do nοt want to deceive others, and they do nοt want to be seen as deceptive. We also find receivers are highly sensitive to the language used to deceive, and are more likely to act in the sender’s favour when the sender lies directly.
Working paper
 

Luca Gasparri (CNRS, Laboratoire Savoirs, Textes, Languages, University of Lille)
"Title"
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Michael Greinecker (ENS-Paris Saclay, Centre for Economics)
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Marco LiCalzi (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia)
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Roni Katzir (Tel-Aviv University, Computational Liguistics Lab)
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Marieke Pahlke (Paris School of Economics, Corvinus University, Budapest)
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Ariel Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University and New York University, Economics)
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Philippe Schlenker (CNRS, Institut Jean Nicod, and New York University)
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Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics, Mathematics)
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Nick Zangwill (University College London, Philosophy)
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